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RAILWAY ECONOMICS IN RHODESIA1
J. H. WEST
HISTORY
Until the 19th century land transport was almost entirely dependant 
on the horse. It was expensive and therefore confined to passengers and high 
value goods which could stand the cost. With the industrial revolution came 
a great demand for coal to provide power for the new factories. But the 
existing roads were unsuitable for heavy loads and colliery owners therefore 
started building their own roads consisting of double strips of stones spaced 
to take the wheels of a horse drawn cart. Wood was sometimes used but it 
tended to rot and was gradually superceded by iron plates, cast iron strips 
and ultimately wrought iron rails. The extra cost of the iron roads was offset 
by m a k i n g  them th i n  and putting flanges on the wheels of the vehicles. 
Pulling several vehicles in a train spread the cost over a greater load and 
this was made possible by the reduction in friction due to the special track.
But to obtain greater efficiency it was necessary to employ some traction 
power much greater and faster than a team of horses. Steam locomotives 
were gradually introduced but were not too successful because the boilers 
did not produce enough steam and because it was universally believed that 
they must have cogged wheels and track. In 1814 the daring innovation of 
smooth wheels was introduced and a little later Stevenson discovered that a 
good head of steam could be maintained if the exhaust from the cylinders 
was led into the furnace and out through the funnel. The turning point was 
reached in 1825 when Stevenson’s Rocket pulled a train of one coach and 
33 wagons from Darlington to Stockton at twelve miles an hour.
Whilst the early tracks were laid on the public highways it was soon 
realised that separate routes werq» needed with smoother curves, smaller 
gradients and shorter distances. Like the canals and roads these early rail­
roads were open to anyone to use and it took some decades for the modern 
principle of the owner being the sole operator, to develop. Once this principle 
was adopted the real advantages of railways—regular traffics, through hauls, 
full truck loads, minimum handling and therefore cheap transport—became 
manifest.
1 P a p e r  re a d  to  th e  S ociety  a t  a  jo in t m eeting w ith  th e  In s titu te  o f  T ra n s p o rt in  
F e b ru a ry , 1968.
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CAPITAL
Because of the need for a specialised track the railways are large users 
of capital. The Rhodesia Railways, for example, owns fixed assets valued 
at £83 million (“fixed” assets include rolling stock). This is not quite as 
large as the Central African Power Corporation’s investment in the Kariba 
system and much less than the total investment in electricity supply in 
Rhodesia and Zambia. Apart from electricity and possibly the Zambian 
copper mining complex it is fairly certain that no other industry in this 
part of the world is as highly capitalised as the Railways. In most other 
countries the situation is similar. Thus in South Africa expenditure on 
railway fixed assets to date exceeds £600 million and in Britain the book 
value of railway fixed assets is £1,720 million. The £83 million of railway 
investment in Rhodesia and Zambia may be compared with Central African 
Airways’ total investment of only £1.5 million or the total expenditure to 
date from Loan Vote by the Rhodesia Government of £21 million on 
roads and bridges.
Not only is the capital large in absolute terms, it is also large in 
relation to revenue earned. The Rhodesia Railways fixed assets of £83 
million, for example, compare with an income in 1965/66 of £37 million from 
sales of transport services. In other words, well over £2 of investment is 
needed for every £1 of annual sales.
It is sometimes said that railways are prejudiced because they have to 
bear the costs of the track, marshalling yards, stations, goods depots, 
signalling and other equipment tied to the ground, whereas airways, road 
vehicles and ships are not similarly burdened. There has frequently been 
public controversy as to whether road transport in particular is sufficiently 
taxed to offset this initial advantage. Perhaps the best approach is to avoid 
the arguments and consider the other side of the coin. As Beeching2 says 
“. . . the benefits which can be derived from possession of this high cost 
route system are very great. First, it permits the running of high capacity 
trains which themselves have very low movement costs per unit carried. 
Second, it permits dense flows of traffic and provided the flows are dense, 
the fixed costs per unij moved are also low. Third, it permits safe and 
reliable scheduled movements at high speeds. In a rationalised system of 
transport we should therefore expect to find railways concentrating upon 
those parts of the total traffic pattern which enable them to derive maximum 
benefit from these three advantages which they have, as the counterpart 
to their unavoidable burden of high system costs.”  As an illustration of 
what can be done in this direction a famous example is a tacomite mine in 
U.S.A. which owns a railway running six trains a day, each with 110 wagons
2  D r. R . B eeching, in  a  speech  to  th e  In s titu te  o f  D irec to rs, L o n d o n , 1962.
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containing 85 tons. The daily movement is 2.6 million ton-miles. The 
Rhodesia Railways cannot match this spectacular feat but they do run an 
enormous quantity of goods over their 2,700 miles of track. In the year 
1965/66 they carried 16 million tons of goods and 4 million passengers. On 
the average each wagon performed 1,200 ton-miles per day, a figure which 
only the largest road vehicles can emulate. The average train contained 
380 tons of goods involving a direct labour complement of only three, a 
driver, a fireman and a guard.
COSTS
Because of high capital costs a large proportion of the annual costs of 
operating a railway consists of interest and redemption on borrowed funds, 
hire purchase repayments and depreciation. In the case of the Rhodesia 
Railways these items in 1965/66 amounted to 20%  of total costs. These 
costs are of a fixed nature and once the capital has been sunk the associated 
annual charges have to be met whatever the volume of traffic. Some of 
these costs can be attributed to particular traffics, for example refrigerator 
cars, tank cars and passenger coaches, which can only be used for specific 
purposes. But the great bulk of such costs cannot be associated with a 
particular category of traffic, and much less with a category on a particular 
route. They are strictly “overheads”.
Another large cost item is renewal of permanent way. Track is constantly 
wearing out and has to be replaced. A track which is wearing out may be 
replaced by a similar track or it may be realigned or reconstructed to take 
more trafijc. In the former case the whole cost is charged as an operating 
expense whereas in the latter the extra cost of improving the line is normally 
capitalised. In the case of the Rhodesia Railways there is a 15 year renewal 
programme, the actual cost of renewals being charged against a fund so that 
the debit to working account can be more or less stabilised from year to year. 
Like capital charges the cost of track renewals cannot be attributed to 
particular traffics and so forms another “overhead”.
Although they are highly capitalised, railways are also big employers 
of labour. The Rhodesia Railways, for example, has a  total complement of 
30,000 people embracing a wide varfety of skills, and making it the biggest 
employer, apart from the combined Governments, of the three countries 
served. The annual bill for salaries and wages comes to £22 million but 
not all of this is an operating cost. Indeed a large part covers maintenance 
of track, locomotives, rolling stock and fixed installations as well as the 
creation of capital assets, particularly buildings. Another large part of the 
bill covers administrative operations such as management, accounting, com­
puting, stores, engineering, personnel, planning etc., which cannot be attri­
buted to any particular traffic but which continue to increase with the
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overall increase in traffics. It is hard to find many examples of salaries and 
wages which are specific to a particular category of traffic. Even the engine 
driver’s wages are normally related to a wide range of traffics though they 
are calculable as a direct cost of any particular route.
Coal, diesel oil and water are analogous to crew wages in that they 
are capable of assessment as far as any particular route is concerned but 
cannot be ascribed to particular traffics.
The general picture therefore is that railway costs cannot usually be 
linked to particular traffics and that only a relatively small part of total 
costs can be regarded as direct costs of operations. By far the largest pro­
portion are overheads which have to be met from revenue as a whole but 
it is quite impossible to say that such and such a traffic ought to make 
such and such a contribution to overheads. For the Rhodesia Railways in 
1965/66 the heading “Operating and Running Costs”, which includes crews, 
maintenance, fuels, servicing depreciation and hire of all rolling stock 
represented only 35%  of total cost.
TARIFFS
Since the costs of carrying any particular commodity are unknown it is 
not possible to base rates on costs. All over the world therefore railways 
have adopted a policy of charging what the traffic can bear. Some traffics 
move at tariff rates which do no more than cover the bare cost of movement. 
Others pay rates which leave a big profit. This policy involves massive cross 
subsidisation between traffics but if properly applied it produces the maximum 
total traffic and therefore—in theory if not always in practice—spreads the 
* overheads on average as thinly as possible.
The difference between the highest and lowest rates is sometimes quite 
remarkable. In many European countries the highest may be only three 
times the lowest. In South Africa the highest rates are about ten times the 
lowest. In Rhodesia, taking 300 miles as the standard Tariff No. 1 works 
out a t 10.3d. per ton-mile whereas the Special Mineral Scale is only 0.7d. 
Between these two rates there are thirteen rates for goods, and in addition 
there are special rates for livestock, motor vehicles, liquids carried in bulk, 
and the four passenger scales.
Determining what rate a  particular commodity can bear is bound to be 
something of an arbitrary matter but eventually the allocation of a  commo­
dity to a  particular rate tends to become hallowed with time. The very first 
public railway established by an Act of Parliament in 1801 set the precedent 
for all its successors though it was itself influenced by the pattern of rates 
charged by the canal operators. This was the Surrey Iron Railway which 
ran between Croydon and Wandsworth. Its tariff contained only 27 items 
grouped into four scales. The lowest was 2d. per ton-mile and included dung
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among other items. The next rate was 3d. per ton-mile for limestone, brick, 
etc., then 4d. per ton-mile for tin, potatoes etc., and finally 6d. per ton-mile 
for “all other goods”.
The Rhodesia Railways tariff book today lists about 2,400 items, though 
many are included more than once. There are four main reasons why the 
same commodity may move at different rates. First, there is a general policy 
of encouraging exports, so, for example, sugar for export moves at a lower 
rate than sugar for local consumption. Second, a  commodity may vary 
considerably in quality so that the high value part is really a different item 
from the low value part. An example is asbestos which moves at three
different rates depending on whether it is valued at under £25 per ton, £25 
to £50 per ton or over £50. Third, there is a preference for goods consumed 
by local industry. An example is cotton yam which has a very favourable 
rate if it is moving to a factory for manufacturing purposes. Fourth, there is 
a discount for quantity and this applies to a large number of commodities. 
The reduction in rate may be concerned purely with different quantities, for 
example maize in bags moves much cheaper in full truck loads than in 
small quantities. Or it may be concerned with different methods of packing. 
For example, coal in bags is much more expensive to move than loose coal 
in big quantities.
Tariffs No. 1 to 10 are basically for relatively small consignments, that 
is those which do not fill a truck. To some extent this is a reflection of 
cqjsts of movement because it costs the same to move a full truck as a 
half empty one. But it is hard to pretend that cost of movement (even if it 
could be calculated) has any great influence on the allocation of commodities 
to rates. Thus glass bottles move at Tariff 10 which is 3. Id. per ton-mile for 
a 300 mile journey, whereas plastic bottles move at Tariff 1 which is 10.3d. 
Tariffs Nos. 11 to 14 and the Special Mineral Scale are for goods moved in 
bulk and a greater quantity of goods, including the whole of the export 
minerals, coal and maize, move on these rates than on Tariffs 1 to 10. 
“What the traffic can bear” is a difficult criterion and it is not easy to 
explain some of the grouping. Comparatively high value commodities such 
as maize and wheat, for instance, moves at the same rate as earth and lime. 
Sugar, which at the moment sells for less than maize, moves at a higher 
rate. Cider moves at a higher rate than beer. Gravestones move at the same 
rate as rectified spirit. There are of course other factors which are taken 
into account before deciding the tariff to which a commodity should be 
alloted. These include risk, packing, cost of handling and weight in proportion 
to bulk, in addition to factors already mentioned. Although it may not 
always be possible to produce convincing reasons why a particular item is 
classified in a particular way, the Harragin Commission which was set up
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in 1958 to report on tariffs, “found no widespread desire for any fundamental 
change in the basic principles of the rates structure established in Rhodesia”.3
The one systematic concession to the principle of cost of service as 
opposed to ability to pay is in relation to terminal charges. It is clear that 
before any commodity actually moves, the Railways incur certain costs and 
there are similar costs after actual rail movement is completed. These are 
called terminal costs and include the provision of sidings, sheds, warehouses, 
marshalling yards, loading, unloading, sheeting, parcel handling, tickets, 
porters, checking and clerical services etc. They amounted to 14% of total 
costs in 1965/66. Strictly speaking there should be an addition to each tariff 
to cover these costs irrespective of mileage, but in fact the method adopted 
is to include first a basic charge which is supposed to represent the direct 
terminal costs and then to spread the balance of such costs over the first 
250 miles of each journey. The result of these two additions is to introduce 
a taper in each tariff the extent of which is appreciable, as illustrated in the 
following table.
Rates for Different Distances
(In Pence per Ton-Mile)
Tariff 50 miles 300 miles 600 miles
>. 1 21.6 10.3 7.5
2 19.7 8.5 6.2
3 17.8 7.1 5.1
4 14.9 6.4 4.5
5 14.4 5.6 3.9
6 13.9 5.0 3.5
7 12.0 4.6 3.2
8 11.5 4.1 2.7
9 10.6 3.5 2.5
10 10.1 3.1 2.1
11 3.1 1.8 1.4
12 2.3 1.4 1.1
13 1.7 0.9 0.8
14 1.6 0.8 0.7
oerals * 1.5 0.7 0.6
Not all railways follow the Rhodesian practice of strict compliance with 
a tariff book for all rail users. In Britain, for instance, there is what is known 
as a selective rating system whereby the Railways cannot charge more than 
the published maxima but can and frequently do charge less. On balance
3 R e p o rt o f  th e  C om m ission  o f  E n q u iry  in to  th e  R atin g  S tru c tu re  o f  th e  R hodesia 
R ailw ays, 1959, page 7.
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and despite its imperfections there seems to be merit in a system in which 
every user knows that he is being treated the same as all others.
One minor feature of the Rhodesia Railways tariff which is of interest 
at the moment is that it is quoted in decimals of a shilling and there is a 
simple table to convert decimals into pence.
REVENUE
Since the booming construction era which ended about the turn of the 
century, railways generally have not been markedly successful from a finan­
cial point of view. The reasons for this have been many and include excessive 
land acquisition costs, over-optimism of promoters, gullibility of the public, 
over capitalisation, duplication of routes, road competition, and state regula­
tion of tariffs. In 1937 nearly a third of the total railway mileage in the 
U.S.A. was in trusteeship or receivership and in many countries it was the 
simple fact of bankruptcy which compelled the State to take over the 
assets and liabilities. The Rhodesia Railways by contrast have been relatively 
prosperous until recently. It is a new factor, the diversion—for political 
reasons—of profitable traffics to other routes, which has put them in the 
red.
Copper is a fairly high rated traffic and in 1965/66 the 1.1 million tons 
which was moved by rail produced a revenue for the Rhodesia Railways 
of £10 million. The shifting of any of this traffic to other routes will clearly 
have an important effect on railway finances since costs are unlikely to move 
downwards and are more likely to increase because of the increased move­
ments of other commodities due to agricultural diversification policies. Some 
4.6 million tons of low rated minerals were moved and produced a revenue 
of only £3.2 million. Coal and coke which move at the lowest tariff produced 
£3.7 million for a movement of 3.4 million tons. General Goods, which 
includes many high rated items, was the biggest earner producing £18.6 million 
for 6.7 million tons. Revenue from passengers amounted to only £2.2 million.
The pattern of revenue in Rhodesia is quite different from that of 
Britain and reflects differences in urbanisation, industrial activity and road 
competition policies. In Rhodesia only a twentieth of total revenue comes 
from passengers compared with a third in Britain. In Rhodesia, General 
Goods (including copper ingots) accounts for three quarters of total revenue 
compared with only a third in Britain. But they both earn roughly the same 
proportion from minerals including coal and coke.
The Rhodesia Railways operate at an exceptionally high load factor. 
Each route mile of track carried no less than 2.2 million ton-miles of goods 
in 1965/66, a figure which few railways outside the big mineral carriers in 
America can emulate. Passenger density is also high because over four-fifths
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of the travellers are Fourth Class. By comparison with older countries there 
are few branch lines and stations while distances are relatively great. The 
typical Rhodesia Railways truck is a 40 tonner compared with a 12 tonner 
in Britain. For these reasons costs and therefore revenue per net ton-mile 
are low, averaging about 1.5d. in 1965/66. The average haul in that year 
was 370 miles so that, by reference to the table given above, it can be said 
very broadly that Tariffs Nos. 1 to 10 are profitable to the railways and the 
lower tariffs are unprofitable.
ROAD-RAIL COMPETITION
Before the advent of the motor vehicle the railways were the great 
developers of unexploited regions. In the older countries they pushed out 
branch lines to every village and hamlet and in the new countries they 
pushed out main lines to any area which offered even a small chance of 
development. In Britain the main casualty of this vigorous expansion was 
the canal system but few people felt much sympathy for its plight and this 
valuable asset gradually became more and more silted up and overgrown. 
More recently airlines have taken traffic from railways particularly in the 
bigger countries such as the U.S.A. Airline competition for passengers has 
been keen and has rarely been subject to control. The railways have 
generally accepted the full force of competition from airlines largely because 
it has in the main been confined to passengers.
But the same considerations do not apply to road-rail competition and 
it is still a lively issue in many countries. In Britain and the U.S.A. it is 
probably fair to say that railways have given up the attempt to stifle 
competition and are actively attempting to meet it by concentrating on those 
transport services in which they are most efficient. Many people were 
advocating such policies before World War II. Mr. F. Smith,4 the Transport 
Chief of Unilever, was typical of this new school. He said there was no need 
for special protection if railways would eliminate uneconomic loading by 
cutting out small stations and branch lines and concentrate on fast goods 
trains between main centres fed by lorries. He said the number of goods 
trains could be cut by two thirds and coaches by a quarter.
After the war a modernisation plan for British Railways was introduced 
to improve competitive*ability and—it was hoped— to reduce losses. This 
involved a whole gamut of developments, including electrification, decentra­
lised traffic management, new tariffs, diesel shunters, double headed diesel 
electric locomotives with only one man in the cab, vacuum brakes, road-rail 
containers, new types of wagons, reduction in the number of small wagons, 
office mechanisation, centralised traffic control systems, colour light signals,
4  B rigadier S ir H . O . M ance, T h e  R o a d  an d  R ail T ra n sp o rt p roblem . P itm an  1941, 
pages 1 4 1 -3 .
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long welded rails, concrete sleepers, higher speeds, quicker turnrounds, hump 
back marshalling yards, automatic couplers, hydraulic brakes, road-railers 
(for use on both road and rail), collapsible containers, air slides for loading 
bulk commodities and a general reduction in the system mileage.
But these measures were not enough to avoid further financial deteriora­
tion and by 1961 the annual operating loss before meeting any capital charges 
had risen to £87 million. In the words of the British Railways Board,3 “the 
burdening of good traffics with costs arising from bad ones has led to the 
transfer to road of a considerable volume of traffic which railways are 
better able to handle, in order to preserve on rail, traffics which could be 
handled better by road”. It was shown that one third of the route mileage 
carried only 1 % of freight and passengers. The least used half of all stations 
produced revenue which did not even cover station costs without any contribu­
tion to operating costs, let alone to overheads. Most rural trains carried 
less than a bus load of passengers and lost twice as much as they collected 
in fares.
No immediate answer to the problem was seen other than to press on 
with modernisation and to cut out uneconomic lines, stations and services. 
It was out of tune with the times to think of protection against road competi­
tion, yet an outside observer cannot help wondering why this should have 
been so. The appalling over-crowding of the roads with their huge toll of 
life and limb is in stark contrast to the safety and economy which railways 
offer their users.
Basically, the whole problem of road-rail competition comes down to 
the simplfe fact of railway tariffs and the “what the traffic can bear” 
principle. If half the traffic is carried at rates above average cost in order 
to subsidise the other half, and if competition is not regulated, then railways 
must lose some if not most of the top half to road transport. As road 
standards improve and lorries get bigger so this process must accelerate.
South Africa has followed a different policy and her railways are almost 
solidly protected against road competition.
In Rhodesia the position briefly is that anyone can carry his own goods 
in his own vehicle but a permit from the Road Services Board is needed to 
carry for hire or reward. Permits for routes which do not interest the 
railways are issued after hearing objections and are very much easier to 
obtain than permits for routes which are in direct competition with rail 
routes.
The Harragin Commission received conflicting evidence of the extent 5
5 T h e  R esh ap in g  o f  B ritish  R ailw ays, L o n d o n , H M S O , 1963 (T h e  “ B eeching”  R e p o rt), 
page 4.
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to which road operators had taken traffic which the railways believed they 
should carry. The Commission accepted, however, that the extent was 
material in “the higher classes of merchandise upon which the railway, 
under its rating principles, depends to make up any deficiency in contribu­
tions to total cost from other traffics unable to bear the full burden”.6 The 
Commission made no recommendations beyond urging the Railways and 
road operators to reach an agreement, which was in fact eventually achieved 
on certain routes. It did, however, express its convictions that road transport, 
if left to its own devices, would tend to settle down in the main traffic stream 
where prospects of profitable operations are brighter and leave to the rail­
ways the low grade and irregular and marginal traffics. The Commission 
believed that there should be some form of stabilisation of public road 
haulage and that this would induce the road haulier to gravitate to the 
shorter hauls where his costs are lower than the railways mainly because 
his terminal costs are small.
To sum up, the position in Rhodesia is that a policy of limited protection 
is followed. This cannot be said to be a fully worked out programme of 
road/rail co-ordination but it has enabled the traditional rating policies to 
be pursued and avoided the expensive modernisation and shut down of 
services experienced elsewhere. It is worthy of note that there has been one 
instance of statutory protection, namely in the Mbizi—Nandi Rail Project 
(Road Vehicle Control) Act, 1966, which virtually prohibits public road 
haulage in the area served by this branch line in the Lowveld.
CONCLUSIONS
* To earn an average return on capital invested in railways, the profit 
element in sales ought to be higher than it is in most other industries. As 
long as investors can see the prospect of a satisfactory return on their 
investment the railways will not be short of capital, but when this prospect 
disappears the sources of finance dry up quickly. Whenever railway profits 
have been depressed for any reason—inefficient management, severe compe­
tition, Government regulation of tariffs etc.—it has frequently happened 
that the State has had to step in and assume ownership. State ownership 
does not change the economic problems of the railways. It merely shifts 
them on to the shoulders^of another group of people—a group who are 
usually more sensitive to pressure from major consumers of rail facilities 
than are private investors and boards of directors. The risk then is that the 
tariff structure will be ossified while the general price level—including most 
railways costs—creeps steadily upwards.
When tariffs are below the economically justified level the demand for
6 Ibid, page 41.
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railway faciliities increases, with the result that still greater sums are 
required for development. The end result can be that an excessive proportion 
of the nation’s capital is invested in railways whilst revenue continually fails 
to meet expenditure. This unfortunate state of affairs has arisen in many 
countries and the vicious spiral of uneconomic rates, mounting deficits and 
exorbitant capital demands, is hard to break.
Because of conservative financial policies—particularly the inclusion in 
costs of both depreciation and loan amortisation—the Rhodesia Railways 
had massive reserves amounting to nearly £30 million at June, 1966. Since 
then the diversion of profitable traffics and the substitution of unprofitable 
traffics must have eroded a fair slice of these reserves.
Under normal conditions the stresses and strains experienced by rail­
ways in more developed countries, and due largely to competition, would 
have materialised over decades in this country. Now, and for different reasons, 
they are upon us, and it will be necessary to consider bold and constructive 
steps to meet the new situation.
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